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LANCTOT *

T

HE Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)I represents a broad
mandate for the improvement of the lives of millions of people
with disabilities. When President George Bush signed the ADA into
law in 1990, he described the new statute as "an historic opportunity" that represented "the full flowering of our democratic principles," noting that it would "signal[ ] the end to the unjustified
segregation and exclusion of persons with disabilities from the
mainstream of American life." 2 Congress had found that "some

43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is
growing older" and that individuals with disabilities continue to
suffer from various forms of discrimination. 4 Further, Congress
found that:
IT] he continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities
the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society isjustifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars
*Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. A.B., Brown University, 1978;J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1981. Special thanks to Alison
Donahue and Joseph Piesco for all their hard work as Managing Editors of the

Symposium.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2. Statement on Signing the American with Disabilities Act of 1990,
PERS 1070 (July 26, 1990).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1).

PUB. PA-

4. See id. § 12101 (a) (2) ("[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and seg-

regate individuals with disabilities, and ... such forms of discrimination .
tinue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.").

con-

(327)
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in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and
5
nonproductivity.
In light of these findings, Congress announced that its purpose in
passing the ADA was "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities" 6 and "to provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals
with disabilities." 7 The ADA passed by huge bipartisan majorities in
both houses of Congress, with apparently widespread popular support as well."
It is now more than five years after the effective date of the
ADA, but a review of the Articles appearing in this Symposium demonstrates that the ADA's promise of an end to discrimination

against people with disabilities has yet to become a reality. 9 In large
part, the failure of the ADA to provide comprehensive protection
against discrimination can be attributed to judicial narrowing of its
provisions. As ADA filings continue to increase in number, many
federal courts have proven to be hostile to claims of discrimination
on the basis of disability. 10 Courts often dismiss ADA cases on the
ground that the plaintiff could not show that he or she was covered
under the ADA as "an individual with a disability." Many courts insist that the ADA requires a searching inquiry into the particular
medical symptoms of each individual plaintiff. The result has been
a patchwork of holdings, often varying from court to court, as to
what set of symptoms constitutes a disability.
It is time for lawyers and academicians to scrutinize the gulf
that has emerged between the ADA's bold mandate of antidiscrimination and the courts' constricted interpretation of that mandate. The most logical place to begin this inquiry is at the
Id. § 12101 (a) (9).
Id. § 12101(b)(1).
Id. § 12101(b) (2) (emphasis added).
See AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EMPLOYEE RIGHTS & EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS, 1-49 to 1-50 (Jonathan R. Mook ed., 1996) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE RGHTS
& EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS] (noting that ADA passed House of Representatives by
vote of 403-20 and passed Senate by vote of 76-8).
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (noting that effective date of ADA was July 26, 1992).
10. See Robert Pear, Employers Told to Accommodate the Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES,
April 30, 1997, at Al (reporting that EEOC had received 72,687 complaints of
disability discrimination in last four years). As of September 30, 1995, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) received more than 55,000 ADA
charges. See Development in the Law-Employment Discrimination, 109 HAv. L. REv.
1568, 1617 (1996).
5.
6.
7.
8.
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threshold issue of what disability means under the ADA." The Villanova Law Review Symposium represents the firststep in what
should be a continuing dialogue among lawyers, scholars and the
courts as to what groups Congress 'intended to protect when it
passed the ADA and what methods of judicial interpretation will
best achieve the ADA's objectives. Until the threshold issue of ADA
coverage is resolved, the ADA will never have the transformative
effect its supporters optimistically anticipated in 1990.
One of the most striking aspects of ADA litigation today is that
there remains such widespread disagreement over what class of
people Congress intended to protect when it passed the ADA. As
Professor Robert Burgdorf notes in his contribution to this Symposium, no other civil rights statute has engendered such controversy
over the threshold issue of coverage. 12 Even assuming that the concept of "disability" is more ambiguous than that of race or sex, however, one reasonably would have expected that some consensus
might have emerged after five years of experience under the Act.
Simple common sense would suggest that certain impairments are,
by their very nature, disabilities per se and presumptively covered.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) guidance to the ADA explicitly anticipates such a development, when it
13
states that some impairments "are inherently substantially limiting.'
Quite the opposite has occurred. Many courts have flatly rejected the concept of a disability per se. 14 Even more disquieting is
11. Only recently has academic attention focused on this critical ADA issue.
See, e.g., Lisa E. Key, Voluntary Disabilitiesand the ADA: A Reasonable Interpretationof
"ReasonableAccommodations," 48 HASTINGS L.J. 75, 84 (1996) (addressing whether
individual with "voluntary" disability is entitled to full protection of ADA). To
date, most of the law review commentary on the definitional sections of the ADA
has been generated by students. See generally Eric Wade Richardson, Comment,
Who Is a Qualified Individual With a Disability Under the Americans With DisabilitiesAct,
64 U. CIN. L. REv. 189, 191 (1995) (emphasizing importance of defining "qualified
individual with a disability" under ADA). Two recent symposia, focusing more generally on ADA issues, have been published. See Symposium, Individual Rights and
ReasonableAccommodations Under the Amercians with DisabilitiesAct, 46 DEPAUL L. REv.
871 (1997); Symposium, Special Issue on the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 38 S. TEX.
L. Ruv. 861 (1997). For a listing of other student written articles on this topic, see
infta notes 18-19, 21.
12. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection From Disability
Discrimination:The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions ofithe Definition ofDisability, 42 VILL. L. REv. 409 (1997). The traditional Title VII protected classes of
race, color, sex, religion and national origin, and ADEA's protected class of those
over age 40, have provided their share of judicial controversy, but the coverage
issues that have arisen have been peripheral to the broader questions arising
under those statutes.
13. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. A § 1630(2)(j) (1997) (emphasis added).
14. See, e.g., Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 336 n.11 (5th Cir. 1996)
("[W]e disagree that hemophilia is a disability per se."), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770
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the judicial refusal to recognize a variety of life-threatening diseases
as disabilities on the ground that they are not sufficiently impairing.
A sampling of some recent opinions may sound the alarm for those
who thought the ADA would eliminate widespread discrimination.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a
woman who had recently had a mastectomy and was undergoing
radiation treatment for breast cancer could not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was an individual with a disability. 15 Several courts have held that an individual with diabetes
does not have a disability under the ADA, as long as the diabetes
can be controlled with insulin. 16 Most recently, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held, en banc, that an
individual who tests positive for human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV), but remains asymptomatic, does not have a disability within
17
the meaning of the ADA.
If cancer, diabetes and HIV infection do not qualify as disabilities per se under the ADA, then it is difficult to imagine who constituted the 43,000,000 people with disabilities whom Congress
(1997); McKey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 956 F. Supp. 1313, 1317 (S.D. Tex.
1997) (stating that ADA does not designate any impairments as disabilities per se);
Merry v. A. Sulka & Co., 953 F. Supp. 922, 925 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (recognizing that no
per se rule makes dyslexia disability under ADA, even though other courts have
held it to be such); Mobley v. Board of Regents, 924 F. Supp. 1179, 1187 n.13
(S.D. Ga. 1996) (stating that it is not "obvious" that asthma is disability under
ADA); Deckert v. City of Ulysses, No. 93-1295-PFK, 1995 WL 580074, at *7 (D. Kan.
Sept. 6, 1995) (arguing that ADA provides no "checklist" of approved disabilities),
affd, 105 F.3d 669 (10th Cir. 1996).
15. See Ellison v.Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether cancer and treatment "substantially limited [plaintiffs] major life activity of working"). The Fifth
Circuit has been reluctant to extend ADA coverage to a variety of serious physical
impairments. See, e.g., Still v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 120 F.3d 50, 51 (5th Cir.
1997) (per curiam) (holding that being blind in one eye is not disability per se);
Burch v. Coca-Cola, Co., 119 F.3d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that untreated
alcoholism is not disability per se); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d
800, 803 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that heart condition with pacemaker is not disability per se); Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 92 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that
high blood pressure is not disability per se); Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d
1385, 1391 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that no circuit court has addressed whether
insulin-dependent diabetes is disability per se).
16. See Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (W.D. Wis.
1996) (rejecting EEOC guidance on issue of mitigating measures as being "in direct conflict" with ADA); Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 812-13 (N.D.
Tex. 1994) (concluding that insulin-dependent diabetes is not disability per se,
despite EEOC guidance to contrary).
17. See Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Md., No. 94-2200, 1997 WL 465301, at
*7 (5th Cir. Aug. 15, 1997) (en banc) (stating that one who tests positive for
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), but has no symptoms, cannot be said to
have disability per se); Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55,
60 (4th Cir. 1995) (same).
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thought it was covering when it passed the ADA. But these cases
typify the fractured nature of ADA case law today. Courts and commentators are split over whether the federal prohibition against discrimination on the basis of disability includes such conditions as
AIDS or asymptomatic HIV infection,' 8 morbid obesity, 19 cancer
and associated conditions 20 or infertility. 2 1 More generally, an
18. Compare Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 942 (1st Cir. 1997) (concluding
that person who is HIV positive has disability under ADA), and Gates v. Rowland,
39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that asymptomatic HIV infection is
disability per se), with Runnebaum, 1997 WL 465301, at *6 (stating that asymptomatic HIV infection not disability per se) and Ennis, 53 F.3d at 60 (same). See generally Jeffrey A. Mello, Limitations of the Americans with Disabilities Act in Protecting
Individuals with HIVFrom Employment Discrimination, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 73, 76
(1994) (discussing HIV-related issues in workplace); Wendy E. Parmet & Daniel J.
Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The Legal Impact of the New Social Constructionof HIV, 23
Am. J.L. & Med. 1 (1997) (same).
19. See Cook v. Rhode Island Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps.,
10 F.3d 17, 23-24 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that question of whether "morbidly
obese" plaintiff is disabled under Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701,
which defines disability much like the ADA defines it, is for jury to decide). See
generallyJane Byeff Korn, Fat, 77 B.U. L. REv. 25, 27 (1997) (describing how law has
responded to claims made by obese people); Karen M. Kramer & Arlene B. Mayerson, Obesity Discrimination in the Workplace: Protection Through a Perceived Disability
Claim Under the RehabilitationAct and the Americans With DisabilitiesAct, 31 CAL.W.L.
REV. 41, 44 (1994) (discussing appropriateness of coverage of obesity discrimination under federal legislation); Andrea M. Brucoli, Comment, Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals: Morbid Obesity as
a Protected Disability or an Unprotected Voluntary Condition, 28 GA. L. REv. 771, 777
(1994) (discussing obesity discrimination);Jay R. Byers, Comment, Cook v. Rhode
Island: It's Not Over Until the Morbidly Obese Woman Works, 20 J. CoRP. L. 389, 392
(1995) (exploring status of handicap discrimination and obesity in employment
arena); Christine L. Kuss, Comment, Absolving a Deadly Sin: A Medical and Legal
Argument for Including Obesity As a Disability Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct,
12J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 563, 568 (1996) (arguing that obesity should be
entitled to disability status under ADA); Dennis M. Lynch, Comment, The Heavy
Issue: Weight-Based Discriminationin the Airline Industry, 62J. AIR L. & COM. 203, 210
(1996) (analyzing weight-based discrimination in airline industry); Carolyn May
McDermott, Note, Should Employers Be Allowed to Weigh Obesity in Their Employment
Decisions?, 44 KAN. L. REV. 199, 199-200 (1995) (arguing that obesity can be covered by federal employment discrimination law).
Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., 100 F.3d 907, 909, 915 (11th Cir.
20. See, e.g.,
1996) (holding that symptoms associated with chemotherapy are not disability
under ADA); Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that temporary psychological condition relating to cancer is not disability under ADA), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1247 (1997); Ellison, 85 F.3d at 193 (holding employee did not establish breast cancer as disability under ADA).
21. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding that infertility is not disability under ADA); Erickson v. Board of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 323 (N.D. Ill 1995) (holding that plaintiffs infertility states
claim under ADA); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 244 (E.D.
La. 1995) (holding that plaintiffs reproductive disorder is not disability under
ADA), affd, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F.
Supp. 1393, 1404-05 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that plaintiff's infertility is covered
under ADA). See generally Sandra M. Tomkowicz, The Disabling Effects of Infertility:
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emerging line of cases excludes from ADA coverage any medical
22
conditions that are fully correctable by medication or other aids.
Several of the Symposium Articles identify other exceptions and restrictions that have been judicially created in recent cases.
How have the courts arrived at these apparently unreconcilable
conclusions? In large part, courts that have narrowed ADA's protected class have done so by insisting that they are required to engage in a "case-by-case" analysis of each individual plaintiffs
medical condition, rather than an analysis of whether a particular
impairment inherently poses such a limitation. 23 By thoroughly
probing each factual aspect of the plaintiffs medical history and
then woodenly applying the definitional section of the ADA, these
courts often conclude that many apparently disabling conditions
are not covered by the ADA. This excessive reliance on a factbound approach to the threshold issue means that each ADA plaintiff is considered in a vacuum, without reliance on other reported
cases addressing the same disease. Each symptom is then scrutinized to see whether the claimant is truly "substantially limited" by
the particular set of symptoms he or she possesses. This methodology enables lower courts to dispose of ADA claims on motions to
dismiss and motions for summary judgment and to insulate their
ADA rulings from further review by resting them on factual findings
of deficiencies in the plaintiffs' particularized medical conditions.
Underlying this ad hoc approach is a palpable reluctance by many
Fertile Grounds for Accommodating Infertile Couples Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051, 1055 (1996) (arguing that employers should provide
reasonable accommodations in workplace under ADA to those suffering from infertility); Deborah K. Dallmann, Note, The Lay View of What "Disability"Means Must
Give Way to What Congress Says It Means: Infertility as a "Disability" Under The Americans with Disabilities Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 371, 376 (1996) (arguing that
infertility is disability under ADA).
22. See Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1391 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding
that insulin-dependent diabetes not disability under ADA); Sicard v. City of Sioux
City, 950 F. Supp. 1420, 1439 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (stating that under ADA, plaintiffs
disability "must be considered in light of... untreated impairment"); Venclauskas
v. Connecticut Dep't of Pub. Safety Div. of State Police, 921 F. Supp. 78, 82 (D.
Conn. 1995) (same);Joyce v. Suffolk County, 911 F. Supp. 92, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(noting that myopia is not disability under ADA even if correctable); cf.Wilson v.
Pennsylvania State Police Dep't, 964 F. Supp. 898, 913 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (concluding
that myopia can be disability under ADA even if correctable by eyeglasses).
23. See generally Development in the Law-Employment Discrimination,supra note
10, at 1609 ("Because the question whether an individual is disabled is so factintensive, courts have developed further exclusions and inclusions on a case-bycase basis."); Richardson, supra note 11, at 225 ("The cases decided under the ADA
thus far demonstrate that courts recognize that an individualized analysis of each
case's facts is necessary to understand the application of the ADA. The courts have
been unwilling to accept any type of blanket exclusion or inclusion of individuals
under the [ADA]'s coverage.").
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333

judges to recognize even the most deadly of diseases-HIV infection, diabetes, hemophilia and cancer-as being presumptively
24
within the protection of the ADA.

A dissection of each ADA plaintiff's particularized medical condition virtually forecloses the development of judicial consensus as
to whether certain diseases are "inherently substantially limiting."
At best, the inevitable result of this ad hoc approach to ADA litigation is to create massive confusion for employers and lower courts.
At worst, judicial construction of the ADA to exclude people with
serious medical conditions from ADA protection means that employers are given free rein to discriminate against such employees.
Could this have been Congress's intent when it passed the ADA?
The Villanova Law Review Symposium represents the first comprehensive examination of this question.
A quick review of the ADA's definitional section is a necessary
starting point. The ADA itself gives limited guidance on the parameters of disability. Congress did not list the specific disabilities it
intended to include when it passed the ADA, although some people
had urged such an approach at the time the bill was under consideration. 25 Instead, Congress listed several conditions it intended to
specifically exclude from coverage. 26 Congress then defined disability in language that appears, at least on its face, to be broad
enough to encompass a wide variety of physical and mental conditions: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
24. See Patrick v. Southern Co. Servs., 910 F. Supp. 566, 567 (N.D. Ala.), affd,
103 F.3d 149 (lth Cir. 1996). The Patrick court bluntly articulated what many
other courts apparently believe:
The initial story of ADA has been the attempt of persons to stretch the
intent of ADA with regard to alleged "disabilities." Much of the criticism
of the ADA in practice has come from the truly disabled who recognize
that such attempted stretches can cause negative reaction to the Act and
perhaps undermine its true purposes.
Id.
25. See Dallmann, supra note 21, at 379 (discussing criticism of vagueness of
statutory language). Some opponents of the ADA argued that employers would be
burdened by an open-ended definition of disability and contended that Congress
should list the disabilities it intended to cover. See id. Congress ultimately did not
follow this suggestion. The legislative history indicates that Congress chose not to
provide such a list because of the difficulty of ensuring the "comprehensiveness of
such a list, particularly in light of the fact that new disorders may develop in the
future." H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 51 (1990).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (1994) (listing exclusions from definition of disability); see also Development in the Law-Employment Discrimination, supra note 10, at
1609 n.52 ("In light of the fact that Congress decided not to offer a listing of
conditions included in the statutory definition of 'disability,' it is noteworthy that it
chose to provide a list of those conditions that, for political reasons, are excluded
from the definition.") (emphasis added).
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one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having
such an impairment." 27 It fell to the EEOC to define the statutory
terms, ostensibly to give guidance to the courts in determining
whether Congress intended to cover particular types of
impairments.
In its original guidance, the EEOC had provided a list of "commonly disabling impairments," such as cancer, tuberculosis, HIV infection and epilepsy, but the agency removed this list from the final
regulations in order to "avoid confusion." 28 Instead, the EEOC's
final regulations define "impairment" to mean:
(1) [a] ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of
the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or (2)
[a] ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental
29
illness, and specific learning disabilities.
"Substantially limits" means:
(i) [u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii)
[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner or duration under which the average person in the
general population can perform that same major life
30

activity.

"Major Life Activities," as defined by the EEOC, include "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking,
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C).
28. See EMPLOYEE RIGHTS & EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS, supra note 8, at 3-15, 3-16
("Apparently, the EEOC was concerned that the list could be misinterpreted as
implying that an individual who has one or more of the listed impairments would
automatically be considered an individual with a disability.").
29. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1), (2) (1997).
30. Id. § 1630.2(j) (1) (i), (ii). Moreover, "substantially limits" requires an
evaluation of "(i) [t]
he nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) [t]
he duration
or expected duration of the impairment, and (iii) [t]he permanent or long term
impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the
impairment." Id. § 1630.20) (2) (i)-(iii).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss2/1
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31
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."
Presumably, ,all these definitions and amplifications sought to give
32
meaning to Congress's express intent in the ADA.

Much of the ensuing judicial discord over the definition of disability has stemmed from the statutory requirement that an impairment "substantially limit" a major life activity. Consider the recent
treatment of asymptomatic HIV infection by the courts of appeals.
The EEOC has taken the position that HIV infection is "inherently
substantially limiting."3 3 Despite this explicit guidance, the courts
remain split over whether a person who is HIV positive, without
symptoms, is an individual with a disability under the ADA. Two
recent appellate decisions illustrate the point. 34 In Abbott v. Brag-

don,35 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held
"unhesitatingly" that "HIV-positive status is a physical impairment
that substantially limits a fecund woman's major life activity of reproduction. '36 In contrast, in Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Maryland,3 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held, en banc, that asymptomatic HIV infection could not be considered to be a disability per se, and that the particular manifestation of the infection must be considered before permitting an ADA
claim to proceed. 38 Writing for six members of the court, Judge
Williams further asserted: "The plain meaning of 'impairment' suggests that asymptomatic HIV infection will never qualify as an im31. Id. § 1630.2(h) (2) (i).
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1) (1994) (explaining that express intent of
ADA is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities").
33. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. A § 1630(2) (j).
34. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 938 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that discrimination in public accommodations violates ADA); Ennis v. National Ass'n of
Bus. & Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting that asymptomatic
HIV infection is disability per se under ADA).
35. 107 F.3d 934, 938 (1st Cir. 1997).
36. Id. at 939, 942. Although its holding appears to state a per se rule, the
Abbott court hastened to qualify it and stated that the ADA requires individualized
determinations and that each case depends on the facts and circumstances
presented. See id. at 949. Other courts have concluded that HIV infection is a
disability per se under federal antidiscrimination laws. See, e.g., Gates v. Rowland,
39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that person with HIV is "individual with
a disability" within meaning of Rehabilitation Act); Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, 862
F. Supp. 1310, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (concluding that individual with HIV has disability within meaning of ADA).
37. No. 94-2200, 1997 WL 465301 (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 1997) (en banc).
38. See id. at *6. The court reaffirmed its holding in Ennis v. NationalAss'n of
Business & Education Radio, 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995), that determinations of
whether an individual has a disability must be made on an individual basis. See
Runnebaum, 1997 WL 465301, at *5.
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pairment: by definition, asymptomatic HIV infection exhibits no
diminshing effects on the individual." 39 At the same time, the court
insisted that the determination of whether a disability exists "must
40
be made on an individual basis."

One might argue that the difference between Abbott and Runnebaum is simply one of semantics, not substance. 4 1 Abbott admits
that some asymptomatic HIV-infected plaintiffs might not be covered under the ADA, and Runnebaum seems to suggest that particular HIV-infected individuals theoretically could make an adequate
factual showing of coverage. 42 The dichotomy emerges from the
analytical framework utilized by each court. Abbott examines the disability itself.43 Runnebaum focuses instead on the individualwith the
disability, concentrating on the specific array of symptoms (or lack
thereof) actually possessed by the plaintiff.44

The Runnebaum

court's insistence that holding HIV-positive status to be a disability
per se would be inconsistent with the ADA ignores the concept of
an "inherently substantially limiting" disability specifically embraced by the EEOC's guidance. Moreover, Runnebaum displays little hesitancy in suggesting that asymptomatic HIV infection may be
45
per se excluded from ADA coverage.
The debate is not simply over whether asymptomatic HIV infection could ever meet the definition of disability. The deeper discord arises over whether the courts should ever hold as a matter of
law that any disabilities are covered per se under the ADA. 4 6 Under

the current state of the case law, a national chain of department
stores may not fire its Rhode Island employees because they are
HIV positive, but may fire HIV-positive employees in Virginia, depending on whether those employees can demonstrate that they
39. See Runnebaum, 1997 WL 465301, at *7.
40. See id. at *5.The court claimed, somewhat cryptically, that some impairments, like blindness or deafness, will always be disabilities. Id. at *5 n.5.

41. In fact, one could distinguish the two cases on their facts, in that the individual with a disability in Runnebaum was a man, not a "fecund woman." See id. at
*2; Abbott, 107 F.3d at 942.
42. See Runnebaum, 1997 WL 465301, at *8; Abbott, 107 F.3d at 943.
43. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 944. The majority opinion in Runnebaum, however,
comes close to barring all claims by plaintiffs with asymptomatic HIV infection. See
Runnebaum, 1997 WL 465301, at *26 (Michael, J., dissenting).

44. See Runnebaum, 1997 WL 465301, at *6-9.
45. See id.
46. See Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 698 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding
as matter of law, insulin-dependent diabetes renders individual not qualified to
drive bus), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1263 (1996). It is worth noting that courts show

no comparable reluctance to uphold employer rules that discriminate on the basis
of having a particular disease, regardless of the particularized medical condition of
individuals adversely affected by the rule. See id.
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possess some additional set of symptoms that are substantially limiting.47 But it is not simply the circuit split that produces the anom-

aly. Under an individualized approach to determining disability,
theoretically, an employer in the Fourth Circuit could have an explicit policy of firing all employees who are HIV positive, but only
those employees who could prove additional "substantially limiting"
symptoms could make even a threshold showing of coverage under
48
the ADA.
Could 'Congress reasonably have intended to make protection
against discrimination contingent on detailed medical determinations about the underlying disability? Does the ADA really require
ad hoc scrutiny of each individual plaintiff's medical condition
before its protections may be invoked? These questions lie at the
heart of the definitional dilemma posed by the ADA. One way to
answer this question is to remember that Congress sought to eradicate prejudice against people with disabilities when it passed the
ADA. 49 By definition, prejudice against people with certain disabilities does not rest on a fact-specific inquiry. 50 Prejudice is not tailored to a person's particular set of symptoms. Prejudice is not
determined by the degree to which a medical condition substantially limits a major life activity. Prejudice stems from over generalizations, myths and stereotypes, unwarranted assumptions and
fear.5 1 In short, prejudice by its very nature is not based on ad hoc
reactions to particular individuals. Prejudice is inherently per se.
An employer who harbors myths or fears about an employee
who is HIV positive is unlikely to calibrate its hostile actions to the
47. See Development in the Law-Employment Discrimination, supra note 10, at
1616 ("[W]ithout clear guidelines for determining the existence of a disability or
ari undue hardship, courts may render inconsistent, and therefore unfair, judgments."). The dissenting opinion in Runnebaum asserted that the decision "moves
this circuit even further from the mainstream of ADA interpretation." Runnebaum,
1997 WL 465301, at *17 (Michael, J., dissenting).
48. See Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 1615 n.98 ("The ambiguity [of many ADA terms]
complicates the task of employment lawyers who counsel employers on compliance
with the [ADA].").
49. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 40 (1990) (stating that people with disabilities have been subject to discrimination "based on characteristics that are beyond
the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypical assumptions, fears
and myths not truly indicative of the ability of such individuals to participate in
and contribute to society").
50. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DIcroNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 977 (2d
ed. 1982) (defining prejudice as "[a]n adverse judgment or opinion formed beforehand or without knowledge or examination of the facts").
51. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) ("[In the Rehabilitation
Act], Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about
disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow
from actual impairment.").
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particular manifestation of that illness. If Congress's intent was to
eradicate prejudice against people with disabilities, one must question whether the current judicial fixation on fact-sensitive medical
analyses can ever achieve that objective. It is far more logical to
conclude that Congress intended to afford broad protection to people with certain diseases against the myths, stereotypes and fears
52
that have prevented them from achieving parity in the workplace.
It is equally logical to assume- that the ADA contemplates the gradual evolution of a set of recognized medical conditions that meet,
as a matter of law, the definition of disability per se.
This is not to say that all individuals with inherently substantially limiting impairments like HIV infection should automatically
prevail in ADA litigation regardless of their particular symptoms.
The appropriate analysis would be to consider the individualized
conditions of plaintiffs when determining whether they are
"qualified" under the ADA-that is, whether they can perform the
essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation. Under this methodology, a person with diabetes who requires insulin would have a disability under the ADA because
diabetes is a physical impairment that substantially limits a major
life activity. Whether the person was "qualified" to perform a particularjob would require consideration of a number of factors, including whether the diabetes was adequately mitigated by the
insulin. The concept of "reasonable accommodation" also necessarily requires case-by-case analysis. 53 But the case-by-case approach
to the determination of disability should be abandoned for impairments that are inherently substantially limiting.
Relying on individualized determinations of whether an individual is qualified would be fully consistent with the EEOC guidance on the issue. 54 To the extent that the EEOC's regulations
52. This is particularly true in light of the well-settled principle of statutory
construction that civil rights statutes are to be liberally construed to achieve their
broad remedial purpose. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971) (civil
rights statutes should be given "'sweep as broad as [their] language'" (quoting
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966))); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co.,
858 F. Supp. 1393, 1402 (N.D. I11.
1994) (stating that civil rights laws are to be
broadly construed).
53. See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities,Discrimination,and
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DuKE LJ. 1, 4-5 (1996) (arguing that case-by-case approach to reasonable accommodation is preferable way for law to develop under
ADA).
54. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. A § 1630(2) (j) (1997) ("Of course, the determination of whether an individual is qualified for a particular position must necessarily be made on a case-by-case basis ....This case-by-case approach is essential if
qualified individuals of varying abilities are to receive equal opportunities to compete for an infinitely diverse range of jobs.").
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seem to suggest that an individualized assessment is necessary for
every determination of disability, 55 they merit reexamination because such a requirement is inconsistent with the concept of an "inherently substantially limiting" impairment. 56 Careful review of the
EEOC's approach to this issue may demonstrate instead that its emphasis on individualized assessment of impairment sought to prevent employers from treating as disabled those employees who are
not in fact substantially impaired and not to enable employers to
exclude employees with disabilities from ADA coverage because
57
they are able to function despite their disability.
A recent district court opinion takes a more expansive approach to the definition of disability. 58 In Wilson v. Pennsylvania
State Police Department,59 Judge Rendell considered whether a plaintiff with myopia could state an ADA claim against the state police
department, which requires that candidates for state trooper cadet
have uncorrected vision of at least 20/70 in one eye and 20/200 in
the other.60 The plaintiffs uncorrected vision did not meet the police department's requirements, although his vision was completely
correctable with corrective lenses. 61 The state police department
moved for summary judgment on the ground that myopia that is
62
correctable is not a substantial impairment under the ADA.

Judge Rendell denied the motion for summary judgment, relying heavily on the EEOC's guidance. 63 Noting that the EEOC states
that "the determination of whether an individual is substantially
limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis,
without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices," she considered whether the EEOC guidance was consistent with the ADA. 64 After an exhaustive review of
55. See id. § 1630.2(j) ("The determination of whether an individual has a
disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the
person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the
individual.").
56. See id.
57. See id. ("Some impairments may be disabling for particular individuals

but not for others, depending on the stage of the disease or disorder, the presence
of other impairments that combine to make the impairment disabling or any
number of other factors.").
58. See Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dep't, 964 F. Supp. 898, 908-13
(E.D. Pa. 1997).
59. 964 F. Supp. 898, 908-13 (E.D. Pa. 1997).

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See id. at 900.
See id.
See id. at 901.
See id. at 905, 913.
Id. at 905 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1997)).
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the legislative history on mitigating measures, 65 she determined
that "the legislative history of the ADA overwhelmingly supports the
EEOC's interpretation" 66 and deferred to the EEOC. 6 7 Judge

Rendell, therefore, permitted the plaintiffs claim to go forward,
noting: "I do not find that the text of the statute unambiguously
precludes a plaintiff from being considered disabled where he is
substantially limited without mitigating measures but is able to use
such measures to overcome the substantial limitations which would
68
otherwise flow from his impairment."
The Wilson case demonstrates how courts should analyze the
threshold issue of disability. The court carefully analyzed congressional intent, examined the legislative history of the ADA and
showed appropriate deference to the EEOC guidelines. 69 More
noteworthy is the court's sensitivity to the underlying principles of
the ADA. The defendants argued in Wilson, as employers have in so
many other cases, that the plaintiff was not sufficiently impaired to
be covered under the ADA, but, at the same time, was too impaired
to meet the requirements of the job.70 The court noted: "There is
a certain irony inherent in defendants' argument: if, by virtue of
his glasses or lenses, plaintiff is not substantially limited in seeing,
how can he nonetheless be too visually impaired-based on his eyes
' 71
without correction-to satisfy the position of state trooper?"
Judge Rendell's perceptive comment illustrates how judges who
construe the ADA in light of its sweeping antidiscrimination mandate will most faithfully adhere to congressional intent.
It may take Supreme Court intervention or a statutory amendment before the courts begin to harmonize the inconsistencies
emerging in ADA litigation. In the meantime, the Villanova Law
Review Symposium on the ADA represents a significant milestone in
developing antidiscrimination law for people with disabilities. By
concentrating on the deceptively narrow issue of "protected class"
under the ADA, the Symposium has generated a number of
thoughtful Articles that should provide fodder for further amplification. Each of the Articles in this Symposium issue provides not
65.
ADA).
66.
67.
68.
69.

See id. (discussing mitigating measures and assessment of disability under
Id. at 912.
See id. at 910.
Id. at 908.
See id.

70. See id. at 902.

71. Id. at 913.
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only a scholarly analysis of the law, but also proposes potential avenues for additional research and litigation.
In their article, Attitudes, Behavior and the Employment Provisions
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Peter Blanck and Mollie
Weighner Marti provide a significant analysis of the state of empirical research on the effect of the ADA. 72 In the absence of such

data, courts and employers rely on their own intuitions, which are
often tinged with bias, as to what Congress intended when it outlawed discrimination against people with disabilities. Some of the
uncertainty surrounding the ADA's legal requirements might be
eliminated by additional empirical research. Blanck and Marti
demonstrate the need for additional empirical study of a number of
aspects of disability discrimination. In particular, they suggest that
further assessment of employer attitudes toward disabilities in the
workplace and employer behavior with respect to such disabilities
would facilitate development of the law. 73 Their Article also sug-

gests that unconscious judicial bias may be responsible for some of
the recent developments in ADA case law. 74 They note that empirical studies demonstrating how inexpensive most ADA accommodations tend to be might counteract judicial reluctance to construe
75
the statute broadly.
Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr.'s article, "SubstantiallyLimited" Protection
from DisabilityDiscrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, reiterates the concern about
judicial "parsimony" in construing the antidiscrimination protections of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.76 Professor
Burgdorf criticizes the creation of a special "protected class" model
for disability discrimination, as this approach inevitably limits the
scope of laws like the ADA to those who can demonstrate that they
meet some threshold definition. 7 7 After reviewing the historical
evolution of the special treatment model, Professor Burgdorf identifies a number of areas in which the courts (and, at times, the
EEOC itself) have strayed from the antidiscrimination principles of
the ADA.7 8 In particular, his article shows how the definition of
72. See Peter D. Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior, and the
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REv. 345
(1997).
73. See id. at 355-56.
74. See id. at 350.
75. See id. at 380.
76. See Burgdorf, supra note 12, at 439;
77. See id. at 568-72.
78. See id. at 451-59.
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disability has been muddied by issues such as the "exclusion from
one job" limitation, the emerging prohibition against coverage of
"temporary" disabilities and the trend toward using 'judicial estoppel" against plaintiffs who have also filed claims for social security
disability. 79 Professor Burgdorf's comprehensive treatment of the
various misconstructions of disability that are emerging in the
courts today should spark additional efforts in this area. Even
more provocative is his argument for an alternative approach to the
current focus on the so-called protected class of people with
80
disabilities.
In her article, RestoringRegardfor the "RegardedAs" Prong: Giving
Effect to Congressional Intent, Arlene Mayerson suggests that many
courts are hostile to the underlying principles of the ADA.8 1 In particular, she criticizes the courts for what she perceives as a narrowing construction of the "regarded as" prong of the ADA's definition
of disability.8 2 She contends that many courts have erroneously required plaintiffs to prove actual physical impairment in order to
meet the requirements of this prong, which is inconsistent with the
purpose of the "regarded as" category. 3 Mayerson also discusses
the emerging "quagmire" over the so-called "single job" exclusion
from ADA coverage, noting that an expansive reading of this exception will undermine the purposes of the ADA.8 4 Mayerson concludes that the courts should be more cognizant of congressional
85
intent in construing the scope of the ADA.

In The New Genetic Age: Do Our Genes Make Us DisabledIndividuals Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct?, Mark S. Dichter and Sarah E. Sutor raise one of the issues likely to engage the attention of
employers and courts in the future-discrimination on the basis of
genetic predisposition to disability.8 6 Dichter and Sutor argue that
plaintiffs seeking to raise such claims will have to show that they are
"regarded as" having the disability to which they are genetically
predisposed and contend that Congress did not intend that the
79. See id. at 439-89.
80. See id. at 571.
81. See Arlene B. Mayerson, RestoringRegard for the "RegardedAs" Prong: Giving
Effect to CongressionalIntent, 42 VILL. L. Rv. 587 (1997).
82. See id. at 591.
83. See id. at 592-93.
84. See id. at 605.
85. See id. at 609.
86. See Mark S. Dichter & Sarah E. Sutor, The New Genetic Age: Do Our Genes
Make Us DisabledIndividuals Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct?, 42 VILL. L. REv.

613 (1997).
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ADA be stretched so far.8 7 They conclude that there are adequate
alternative statutory protections to guard against employer discrimi88
nation on the basis of genetic testing.
Stanley S. Herr also addresses the issue of mental health disabilities, but in the unique context of bar admissions. 89 In Questioning the Questionnaires: Bar Admissions and Candidates with Disabilities,
Herr not only provides a theoretical analysis of the complex interrelationship between the ADA and the duty of bar examiners to ascertain fitness to practice law, but also describes a litigation strategy for
challenging bar practices that violate the ADA.90 By carefully assessing whether various mental illnesses should be the subject of inquiry by bar examiners, his article further indicates the need for
careful definition of which disabilities merit protection under the
ADA.
Finally, Peggy R. Mastroianni and Carol R. Miaskoff focus their
attention on Coverage of PsychiatricDisordersunder The Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, an area of particular difficulty for employers and the
courts. 9 1 Their Essay carefully analyzes the applicability of the disability definition to current psychiatric disorders. 92 They note that
some courts have correctly understood certain psychiatric disorders
to be inherently substantially limiting, without parsing through the
statutory definition. 9 3 As part of this analysis, they examine the
broader issue of whether the scope of the ADA's protection should
hinge on the effect of medication in alleviating or controlling
otherwise disabling impairments. 94 Their Essay is of particular
value to scholars and litigants because it highlights potential legal
problems with respect to disabilities that are increasingly becoming
the subject of litigation.
As the federal courts grapple with the issue of coverage under
the ADA, the absence of consensus on the meaning of disability will
continue to create confusion for employers and litigants. Ad hoc
decisionmaking in these cases simply cannot achieve the intent of
Congress to provide "clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standardsad87. See id. at 618.
88. See id. at 633.
89. See Stanley S. Herr, Questioningthe Questionnaires:BarAdmissions and Candidates with Disabilities,42 VILL. L. REv. 635 (1997).
90. See id. at 655-65.
91. See Peggy R. Mastroianni & Carol R. Miaskoff, Coverage of PsychiatricDisorders Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 42 VILL. L. REv. 723 (1997).
92. See id. at 725.
93. See id. at 738.
94. See id. at 733.
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dressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 95 The
Villanova Law Review Symposium can only be a first step in encouraging additional scholarship in the area of disabilities discrimination. Without such effort, the ADA's bright promise of fairness to
employees with disabilities may never come to fruition.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2) (1994) (emphasis added).
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